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 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction schemes may deter small farms from participating. Depending onThe transformation of agri-food systems towards high-value
supply chains implies a modernization of procurement systems in
developing countries (Boselie et al., 2003; Reardon et al., 2003).
Supermarkets in particular increasingly switch from buying
through spot-market transactions to contractual agreements with
farmers, often through specialized intermediaries (Balsevich et al.,
2006; Berdegué et al., 2005; Neven et al., 2009; Rao and Qaim,
2011). There is an emerging body of literature analyzing how small-
holders can be linked successfully to modern supply chains (e.g.,
Asfaw et al., 2009; Henson et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2007;Maertens
and Swinnen, 2009). There are also numerous studies discussing
the beneﬁts and risks of contract agriculture (Glover, 1987; Gow
and Swinnen, 2001; Mangala and Chengappa, 2008; Peterson
et al., 2001; Simmons et al., 2005; Singh, 2002). However, both
strands of literature hardly address details of concrete contractual
arrangements between sellers and buyers in the context of emerg-
ing value chains and modernizing retail structures.
This is considered a drawback, because the design of contracts
can crucially affect smallholder participation. For instance, con-
tracts imposed by modern retailers often involve a number of
requirements, like minimum quantities to be delivered or certain
quality speciﬁcations, which are difﬁcult to meet by smallholder
farmers. Moreover, lack of credit or delayed payment in contractll rights reserved.
x: +254 20 722 4001.
ann).the availability of other marketing options, smallholders may also
simply be reluctant to commit themselves to a certain buyer. Such
aspects of personal preferences have hardly been considered in
previous research. With few exceptions (Blandon et al., 2009;
Guo et al., 2007; Masakure and Henson, 2005), available studies
explain farmers’ participation in modern supply chains through
farm, household, and contextual characteristics, without explicitly
accounting for subjective attitudes. This implicitly assumes that all
farmers would sell in modern supply chains, if they were able to. In
reality, this may not always be the case.
This article addresses these research gaps by analyzing trade
relations between farmers and buyers in different marketing chan-
nels, using the example of sweet pepper in Thailand. Sweet pepper
was introduced in Thailand some 10 years ago, mainly for exports
and upscale domestic supermarkets. Over time, it gained wider
popularity among domestic consumers, so that sweet pepper is
nowadays also traded in more traditional wholesale and retail
markets. Today, different contractual arrangements between farm-
ers and traders can be observed.
Building on primary survey data, we analyze three main as-
pects. First, we describe trade relations of coexisting marketing
channels and highlight differences between traditional and mod-
ern supply chains. Second, we examine farmers’ subjective motiva-
tion to participate in particular marketing channels. And third, a
choice experiment is used to analyze farmers’ attitudes towards
contracts and different hypothetical contract designs.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next section
gives some background information about the empirical database,
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for sweet pepper in Thailand. Subsequently, different institutional
arrangements between farmers and traders are compared, and rea-
sons for farmers’ marketing decisions are analyzed, before the
choice experimental results are discussed. The last section
concludes.Table 2
Sweet pepper adoption and supply of different marketing channels (number of
farmers), 1999–2007.
Year Whole sample Companies Village traders Royal Project
1999 4 4 0 0
2000 7 7 0 0
2001 17 14 3 0
2002 52 38 12 2
2003 76 50 22 4
2004 119 58 51 10
2005 152 48 92 12
2006 230 44 167 19
2007 244 45 178 21Data base and background
Data base
For our empirical study, we conducted a survey of 244 sweet
pepper farmers in the Mae Sa watershed in Chiang Mai Province,
northern Thailand. This watershed is where domestic sweet pepper
cultivation had started in 1999, and it is still the main production
area for sweet pepper in Thailand. The survey was conducted be-
tween May and July 2007. The Mae Sa watershed consists of 22 vil-
lages in total, but sweet pepper is cultivated in only 9 villages. In
2007, 252 farmers grew sweet pepper within these 9 villages.
We tried to interview all of them, but four farmers were in the pro-
cess of changing from sweet pepper to tomato cultivation, three
were traveling outside the village during the survey period and
therefore not available, and one farmer refused to answer the ques-
tionnaire. The 244 remaining sweet pepper farmers were inter-
viewed by six trained enumerators from Chiang Mai University.
Interviews were conducted in Thai, using a structured question-
naire especially designed for this research. Farm and farmer char-
acteristics of the sample are displayed in Table 1.
Marketing channels for sweet pepper
Sweet pepper was introduced in Thailand in 1999 by a Dutch
company. Because of climatic conditions, the northern upland
areas were the primary target regions, especially those near the
city of Chiang Mai, where infrastructure and market access condi-
tions were relatively favorable. In particular, the company chose
the Mae Sa watershed, where farmers were contracted to produce
red and green sweet pepper in greenhouses, using hydroponics
systems that make cultivation independent from soil qualityTable 1
Characteristics of sweet pepper farmers, 2007.
Variables Full sample
(N = 244)
Characteristics of the person responsible for farming decisions
Female (%) 45.9
Age in years 42.2 (9.3)
Education in years of schooling 6.9 (3.3)
Farm and household characteristics
Land owned (rai) a 3.9 (6.4)
Sweet pepper area (rai) a 1.3
Land title b (%) 82.4
Farming experience (years) 13.9 (9.4)
Sweet pepper experience (years) 2.7 (1.9)
Pick-up truck (%) 76.6
Off-farm occupation (%) 39.8
Contextual characteristics
Member in a farm group (%) 82.0
Extension contact (%) 18.0
Good road conditions 78.3
Medium road conditions (%) 12.3
Bad road conditions (%) 9.4
Notes: Mean values are shown. For continuous variables, standard deviations are shown
* Differences in mean value between contract and non-contract farmers are signiﬁcan
*** Differences in mean value between contract and non-contract farmers are signiﬁcan
a One rai equals approximately 0.4 acres.
b Land title is deﬁned as having a land title for at least one of the plots under cultivaconditions (Schipmann and Qaim, 2010). Sweet pepper cultivation
is labor and input intensive and associated with high capital
investments, since sophisticated greenhouses are required. Since
farms in the watershed are predominantly small-scale, with an
average farm size of 1.6 acres, the company initially provided cred-
it, private extension, and certain inputs to contracted farmers.
In 2007, three different marketing channels existed for farmers.
The ﬁrst consists of private agribusiness ﬁrms that deal with sweet
pepper for export and for domestic supermarkets. Beyond the
Dutch company, which had started the business in 1999, two addi-
tional ﬁrms have entered the market more recently. All three com-
panies purchase sweet pepper from local farmers. The second
marketing channel is the so-called Royal Project, which started to
deal with sweet pepper in 2002. The Royal Project is a subsidized
initiative by the King of Thailand to support disadvantaged farmers
in the upland areas and offer alternatives to opium production,
which was widespread in the 1970s and 1980s. The Project sells
vegetables and other agricultural products in upscale retail outlets
under its own brand name, which Thai consumers recognize as
being of very high quality. However, only hill tribe farmers, who
make up a relatively small part of the population in the Mae Sa wa-
tershed, ofﬁcially have access to the Royal Project marketing chan-
nel. We consider these ﬁrst two marketing options as modern
retail channels. In contrast, the third channel involves traditional
village traders, who also entered the sweet pepper market moreNon-contract farmers Contract farmers
(N = 132) (N = 112)
50.8 40.2*
42.4 (9.4) 42.1 (9.3)
6.8 (3.4) 7.0 (3.2)
3.5 (5.8) 4.3 (7.0)
1.5 (1.3) 1.1*** (0.8)
93.2 69.6***
13.5 (9.0) 14.4 (9.9)
2.8 (1.9) 2.6 (1.8)
72.7 81.3
40.2 39.3
78.8 85.7
18.9 17.0
85.6 69.6***
9.1 16.1*
5.3 14.3***
in parentheses.
t at the 10% level.
t at the 1% level.
tion.
Table 3
Importance of contracts by marketing channel (in %), 2007.
Contracts Whole sample (N = 244) Village traders (N = 178) Companies a (N = 45) Royal Project b (N = 21)
Farmers without a contract 54.1 68.5 13.3*** 19.1***
Farmers having an oral contract 30.7 27.0 28.9 66.7***
Farmers having a written contract 15.2 4.5 57.8*** 14.3*
* Differences are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
*** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
a Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between company and village trader suppliers.
b Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between Royal Project and village trader suppliers.
Table 4
Aspects that are regulated in contracts by marketing channel (in %), 2007.
Aspect regulated Whole sample (N = 112) Village traders (N = 56) Companies a (N = 39) Royal Project b (N = 17)
Side selling 13 11 23 0
Pricing 47 63 28*** 41
Delivery 33 9 67*** 35***
Grading 22 29 13* 24
Production process 12 7 5 41***
GAP 3 0 0 18***
* Differences are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
*** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
a Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company and contract village trader suppliers.
b Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers.
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kets in Chiang Mai and Bangkok.
Table 2 shows the development of these three marketing chan-
nels over time. This information was obtained through recall ques-
tions during the 2007 survey. In the ﬁrst 2 years, all farmers sold
their sweet pepper through the company channel. However, since
2005 traditional village traders have constituted the most impor-
tant marketing channel, while the number of farmers supplying a
company is steadily decreasing. The role of the Royal Project in-
creased over time, but the overall market share remains relatively
small. Managers of the three companies stated in interviews with
us that they did not reduce the cooperation with local farmers from
their side. Hence, the declining number of company channel sup-
pliers appears to be driven mainly by farmer preferences to sell
to village traders. Understanding such preferences is important
to explain farmer participation in modern retail channels.1 Farmers can get a GAP certiﬁcate when they produce according to the standard
set up by the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives for each product. Products
produced under the GAP certiﬁcate can be sold in retail markets under the so-called
Q-label (Q standing for quality).Supply chain differentiation and contractual arrangements
Contractual arrangements in different marketing channels
In a ﬁrst step, we are interested in the importance of contractual
arrangements in the different marketing channels. Table 3 shows
that more than half of all sweet pepper farmers sell without any
contractual arrangement. However, not all of these sales are
spot-market transactions in a narrow sense, because farmers often
have long-term informal relationships with their buyers without
considering this as a binding arrangement. In those cases, concrete
transactions are not agreed upon in advance, so that farmers re-
main ﬂexible in their marketing decisions. Table 3 also conﬁrms
that contractual arrangements are signiﬁcantly more often used
in modern than in traditional supply chains.
We further differentiate between oral and written contracts.
Oral contracts are observed more often, although the picture dif-
fers across marketing channels. Private companies in particular
use signiﬁcantly more written contracts. As they are run by non-lo-
cals, company agents are not integrated into the farmers’ social
networks; hence, they would not trust oral arrangements. This
has also been reported in other contexts (Guo et al., 2007; Nagaraj
et al., 2008).Comparison of contract details
In the literature, it is often separated between production con-
tracts and marketing contracts (Guo and Jolly, 2008; Singh, 2002;
Wiboonpongse et al., 1998). Even though in our case all contractual
arrangements comprise some features of both, marketing compo-
nents dominate in contracts with traditional village traders and
companies, whereas Royal Project contracts focus more directly
also on production aspects.
Table 4 displays aspects that are regulated in contracts, differ-
entiated by marketing channel. Most contracts refer to more than
one aspect, so that the columns sum up to more than 100%. In con-
tracts with village traders, pricing is by far the most important
component; usually a minimum procurement price is speciﬁed.
Another important component in village trader contracts is the
speciﬁcation of grading criteria. Given that high-value market seg-
ments for vegetables in Thailand are still emerging, uniform qual-
ity standards do not yet exist. In contrast, in company contracts the
timing of delivery is the central feature, followed by pricing and
agreements about side selling (i.e., whether or not sales to other
buyers are allowed). Grading criteria play a smaller role; at least
the biggest of the three companies uses a grading machine, so that
special contractual speciﬁcations are not required. In the Royal
Project channel, most contracts refer to pricing and details about
the production process. The Royal Project is also the only market-
ing channel that requires a Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) certif-
icate from some suppliers.1
Another interesting aspect in some contracts relates to input
delivery. As village traders sometimes also sell inputs to farmers
that are not contracted, related details are not included in Table
4, but are shown separately in Table 5. The ﬁrst two Table columns
compare the situation of farmers with and without contract,
whereas the other columns further differentiate between
marketing channels. To facilitate comparisons and better highlight
Table 5
Input delivery and payment mode for output sales (in %), 2007.
Inputs Comparison between contracts Comparison between contract farmers
No contract (N = 132) Contract a (N = 112) Village traders b (N = 56) Companies c (N = 39) Royal Project d (N = 17)
Input delivery 40 74*** 59** 85*** 100***
Payment for output sales
At delivery 23 13* 18 10 6
Within 1 week 25 30 27 41 18
Later than 1 week 52 56 55 49 77
* Differences are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
a Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract and non-contract farmers.
b Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between village trader suppliers with and without contract.
c Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company and contract village trader suppliers.
d Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers.
Table 6
Timing and duration of contracts (in %), 2007.
Timing All contract farmers (N = 112) Village traders (N = 56) Companies a (N = 39) Royal Project b (N = 17)
Before production 71 54 87*** 94***
Before harvest 29 46 13*** 6***
Duration
One season 92 89 100** 82
Ongoing 8 11 0** 18
** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
a Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company and contract village trader suppliers.
b Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers.
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‘‘no contract’’ farmers only refers to those that sell to traditional
village traders without a contract, whereas in the modern retail
channels, we only consider the majority of farmers that sell under
contract. The results show that the percentage of farmers who pur-
chase inputs from the same trader that they also sell to is signiﬁ-
cantly higher among contract farmers. Under contract, inputs can
be bought on credit, whereas non-contract farmers usually have
to pay directly in cash. Hence, better access to inputs may be one
reason for farmers to enter into contractual arrangements, which
will be analyzedmore explicitly further below. Overall, input deliv-
ery plays a bigger role in modern retail channels than in traditional
supply chains.
The lower part of Table 5 provides details about payment modes
for sweet pepper sales. Here, differences between the marketing
channels are less pronounced. Even in the non-contract village tra-
der channel, most farmers are paid later than 1 week after product
delivery. In this connection, observations from different countries
can vary widely. For instance, Guo et al. (2007) found that payment
directly after delivery is the most common practice in contract
farming in China, whereas Nagaraj et al. (2008) reported that con-
tract vegetable farmers in India are often paid with a delay of
15 days or more.
Looking at the timing of contractual arrangements (Table 6), we
ﬁnd that most contracts are made before the production process
starts. This holds true in all marketing channels, although the share
of contracts that are only made before the harvest is bigger in tra-
ditional than in modern supply chains. This suggests that contracts
with village traders provide somewhat greater ﬂexibility for farm-
ers. Yet, in terms of contract duration, Table 6 shows that almost all
contracts are relatively short term in nature, mostly referring to
only one production season. A similar result was reported by Guo
and Jolly (2008).Reasons for farmers’ marketing decisions
After having described the existing marketing channels for
sweet pepper and related institutional details, we now want to
analyze farmers’ motivations behind participating in particular
channels. In the following, we ﬁrst compare economic incentives
before examining subjective reasons as stated by respondents in
the interviews.
Economic incentives
The ﬁrst and most obvious potential economic incentive for par-
ticipating in a particular marketing channel is the expected or ac-
tual output price received. Table 7 shows how prices compare
across marketing channels. Sweet pepper prices differ according
to color and grade. There is green and red sweet pepper, and both
colors are traded in the grades AB and C. Surprisingly, differences
between contract and non-contract transactions are relatively
small in many cases. Comparing the three contract marketing
channels, the Royal Project always pays the best price, especially
for the higher grade. Yet, these prices are partly subsidized, and,
as mentioned above, participation in this channel is conﬁned to
certain minority groups. Companies pay a slightly higher price
than village traders for green and a lower price for red sweet pep-
per, yet these differences are not statistically signiﬁcant. This sug-
gests that price differences may not be the main factor explaining
farmers’ marketing choices. Similar results were also found in
other contexts (Hernández et al., 2007; Nagaraj et al., 2008),
although there are also examples with more considerable price dif-
ferences between traditional and modern supply chains (Balsevich
et al., 2006; Mangala and Chengappa, 2008).
In order to analyze economic incentives more broadly, we
compare costs, revenues, and gross margins of sweet pepper
Table 7
Average sweet pepper prices (in Thai Baht/kg), 2007.
Variety and grade Non-contract farmers Contract farmers
Village traders (N = 122) Village traders a (N = 56) Companies b (N = 39) Royal Project c (N = 17)
Green, AB 33 31 33 41***
Green, C 21 19 20 21
Red, AB 43 49* 45 62*
Red, C 29 31 28 34
* Differences are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
*** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
a Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between village trader suppliers with and without contract.
b Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company and contract village trader suppliers.
c Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers.
Table 8
Gross margin analysis (in Thai Baht/acre), 2007.
Particulars Non-contract farmers Contract farmers
Village traders (N = 122) Village traders a (N = 56) Companies b (N = 39) Royal Project c (N = 17)
Yield (kg/acre) 6.29 8.03** 8.19 11.33**
Share of red sweet pepper in total (%) 52.13 43.22 79.70*** 70.31**
Revenues 210,593 284,648*** 323,255 576,292***
Input costs (chemicals and organic fertilizer) 55,440 70,280* 77,582 85,917
Seed costs 18,731 21,875 31,355* 28,804
Labor costs 9842 7061 13,322 15,864
Total variable costs 84,013 99,216 122,259 130,585
Gross margin 126,580 185,431** 200,996 445,707***
* Differences are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
a Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between village trader suppliers with and without contract.
b Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company and contract village trader suppliers.
c Signiﬁcance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers.
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tend to have higher yields than non-contract farmers, regardless of
whether they participate in traditional or modern retail channels.
This also leads to higher revenues and gross margins. These com-
parisons cannot explain if contract farming leads to changes in
crop management practices that cause higher yields, or if relatively
high yields are a precondition for participating in a contract market
channel. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the
direction of causality, the results still provide a hint that expected
ﬁnancial beneﬁts may play a role for farmers to engage in contrac-
tual arrangements.
Comparing the three contract channels, it becomes obvious that
participation in the Royal Project is particularly lucrative for those
farmers who are eligible to this channel. Though not statistically
signiﬁcant, mean gross margins are also slightly higher in company
channels than in village trader contract channels. This can mostly
be explained by the greater importance of red-colored sweet pep-
per varieties that fetch higher prices than green ones. Hence, mod-
ern retail channels seem to offer a certain advantage over
traditional markets. The fact that many farmers nevertheless drop
out of the company channel may potentially be due to their inabil-
ity to produce more red sweet pepper. Another possible reason
may be that ﬁnancial incentives are too small to compensate for
perceived disadvantages associated with supplying companies,
such as less ﬂexible contracts. This will be further analyzed below.
Subjective reasons stated by farmers
Both the number and the share of farmers that supply sweet
pepper through company channels have declined over time. As
shown in Table 2, in 2007, 45 of the 244 sample farmers were sup-
plying companies. Yet 109 farmers mentioned that they had sup-
plied companies in the past; all 64 company dropouts haveswitched to supplying village traders. Of the 178 village trader sup-
pliers in 2007, 114 have always supplied sweet pepper to village
traders. Among the Royal Project suppliers in our sample, none re-
ported to have switched marketing channels since they started
sweet pepper production. Table 9 summarizes the farmers’ an-
swers to a question about the most important perceived advanta-
ges of their own marketing channel in comparison with other
alternatives. Only answers from those farmers who always sup-
plied the same marketing channel are considered here.
There is a striking difference in stated advantages between
non-contract and contract village trader suppliers. Whereas price
is by far the most important perceived advantage for contract
suppliers, non-contract farmers value their independence highest,
closely followed by price, and the ability to discuss with the tra-
der. Hence, losing degrees of freedom and the option to negotiate
on the spot seem to be important reasons for some farmers not to
engage in contracts. The statements about price advantages may
appear somewhat contradictory; they reﬂect that farmers do not
always have perfect price information. As discussed, actual differ-
ences in mean prices with and without contract are relatively
small.
For modern retail channel suppliers, assured market access and
input provision are the most important perceived advantages, sug-
gesting that imperfections in input and output markets are gener-
ally felt as constraints. This may be due to seasonal market
saturation in traditional channels and credit constraints, among
other reasons. Similarly, Masakure and Henson (2005) found mar-
ket uncertainty as a major reason for vegetable farmers in Zimba-
bwe to contract with an export company, while Minten et al.
(2009) identiﬁed the option to obtain inputs on credit as an impor-
tant factor among vegetable producers in Madagascar; in both
these studies, higher incomes were only mentioned as a minor
incentive to sign a contract.
Table 9
Farmers’ perceived advantages of supplying a particular marketing channel (in %), 2007.
Non-contract Contract farmers
Village traders (N = 77) Village traders (N = 37) Companies (N = 39) Royal Project (N = 17)
Independence 31 11
Price 29 43 18 47
Ability to discuss 23 8
Personal relation 17 14
Transport 4 11
Input provision 14 49 71
Knowledge transfer 23 52
Market access 52 53
Note: Farmers were allowed to mention more than one advantage. Only those who always supplied to the same marketing channel are considered.
Table 10
Farmers’ stated reasons for changing marketing channels (in %), 2007.
Initial reasons for company
supply (N = 66)
Reasons for
change (N = 66)
Advantages from supplying village traders
with contract (N = 19)
Advantages from supplying village traders
without contract (N = 47)
Input provision 41
Market access 22
Knowledge
transfer
50
Price 33 58 44
Independence 19 11 35
Ability to
discuss
16 16
Personal
relation
16 20
Intransparent
grading
50
Transport
difﬁculty
8
Note: Farmers were allowed to mention more than one reason/advantage. Only those who changed their marketing channel over time are considered.
2 Two farmers did not answer the questions in the choice experiment, so that they
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their marketing channel from supplying companies to supplying
village traders either with or without contract. Knowledge transfer
and input provision are the most important reasons why those
farmers initially supplied a company. This makes sense, because
companies had introduced sweet pepper in Thailand and were
the only buyers of output and sellers of speciﬁc inputs during the
ﬁrst years. Now that related production technologies are more
established, company contracts are no longer a precondition for
growing sweet pepper. Accordingly, many farmers have switched
permanently to supplying village traders. Indeed, most of the farm-
ers who changed their marketing channel over time had started
sweet pepper production in the early phase between 1999 and
2001.
When asked about concrete reasons for withdrawing from com-
pany channels, many farmers named strict and intransparent grad-
ing procedures (Table 10). Companies tend to grade in the absence
of farmers. Moreover, at least one company uses a grading ma-
chine, so that farmers have no scope for discussion. These results
support our earlier ﬁnding that there is limited trust between
farmers and companies. Whereas written contracts can help to
overcome some problems of trust from the companies’ point of
view, they hardly address farmers’ concerns, at least not with the
design used in this speciﬁc context. The second important reason
stated for withdrawing is price, followed by the preference for
independence. In a review of different studies, Sartorius and Kir-
sten (2007) also found that distrust, combined with a perceived
loss of autonomy, is a major reason for contract failures between
smallholder farmers and agribusiness companies.
Better prices are stated as the main advantage from supplying
village traders with or without contract by those who switched(third and fourth column of Table 10). As expected, non-contract
village trader suppliers value independence higher than farmers
who entered into a new contract. However, the fact that still 11%
of the contract suppliers mention independence reﬂects that con-
tracts with village traders are perceived less conﬁning than those
with companies.Farmers’ marketing preferences: a choice experiment
In order to analyze farmers’ attitudes towards contracts and
speciﬁc contract designs, a choice experiment was carried out with
all 244 farmers as part of the farm survey.2 Before conducting the
choice experiment, it was carefully explained to farmers that all con-
tract speciﬁcations used for this purpose were hypothetical ones,
that is, they differed from existing contracts in terms of one or more
attributes. The attributes and attribute levels used were carefully ex-
plained. Farmers were assured that their choice of a speciﬁc contract
design or market channel in the experiment would not have any
immediate consequence on their actual marketing activities. It was
clariﬁed that the results would be used more generally to identify
how trade relations can be designed to be more attractive for farm-
ers. In the following, we ﬁrst describe the experimental design, be-
fore discussing the econometric approach and the estimation results.
Experimental design
The choice experiment method is theoretically based on Lancas-
ter’s model of consumer choice and econometrically on randomwere excluded from this analysis.
Table 11
Marketing channel attributes and attribute levels used in the choice experiment.
Attribute Attribute levels
1 2 3 4
Price in Thai Baht (kg) Market price +5 +15 +25
Input/credit provision None Seeds and chemicals Seeds, chemicals, and additional credit
Payment mode Payment at delivery 25% of expected minimum payment is paid a
month before harvest starts
Relation to the buyer Buyer is personally known Buyer is known through other village traders Buyer is not known at all
5 The latter also holds true for nested logit models. However, the assumption of
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tion is that demand is deﬁned over the characteristics of goods,
rather than over goods themselves. Therefore, choice experiments
consist of different alternatives of a good, which contain various
attributes with different attribute levels. That is, the respondent
has to choose a certain combination of attribute levels, which char-
acterize the good, rather than the good as such. It is assumed that
the respondent chooses the combination, which gives the highest
subjective level of utility. Choice experiments were initially ap-
plied in marketing and environmental economics, but recently
they found broader application. In our case, we apply a choice
experiment to identify farmers’ preferences and attitudes towards
different ‘attributes’ of a contractual arrangement.
Different experimental methods exist, such as contingent rank-
ing, rating, and choice. Here we use the contingent choice ap-
proach, which is based on Louviere and Woodworth (1983);
compared to the alternatives it builds on a somewhat more realis-
tic setting, because farmers usually only select one out of several
possible marketing channels.3 In the questionnaire and experimen-
tal design, we identiﬁed four contract attributes that we felt might
be of importance for farmers and for which we found differences
in the comparison of marketing channels. These are price, input pro-
vision, payment mode, and relation to the buyer.4 Price has four lev-
els of valuation, payment mode has two, and the other two attributes
have three levels each (see Table 11).
This set of attributes and levels implies a total of 72 (4  2  32)
theoretically possible alternatives. By using an orthogonal design
procedure (Louviere et al., 2000), a fraction of the complete facto-
rial design was obtained, giving 16 alternatives to be presented to
respondents. However, when testing the choice experiment, farm-
ers assessed four of the alternatives to be unrealistic. For instance,
a combination of the attribute levels ‘not knowing the trader’ with
‘payment of 25% for a minimum quantity before harvest’ was felt
improbable. Following other studies (Gonzalez et al., 2009), we ex-
cluded four unrealistic alternatives; while this reduces statistical
efﬁciency (Lancsar and Louviere, 2006) it increases the degree of
market realism.
The remaining 12 alternatives were assigned to six choice sets,
each comprising three alternatives: the ﬁrst two were taken from
the 12 orthogonally designed alternatives, and the third always
displayed a combination of the lowest levels of all four attributes.
In other words, the third option portrayed all the characteristics of
the marketing situation of village trader suppliers without a con-
tract, whereas the other two alternatives described a hypothetical
marketing option under contract with different contract attributes.
The two contract alternatives were purposely assigned to a choice
set to ensure that none of the options is predominant and that3 In our sample of 244 farmers, only 8 had more than one marketing channel.
4 Additional contract attributes could have been interesting, but we decided to
limit ourselves to four, in order to keep the experiment sufﬁciently simple and ensure
that farmers base their choices on the combination of all attributes. While
differentiation between oral and written contracts may appear relevant in general,
this attribute would not have been independent from the relation to the buyer. In the
local setting, written contracts are uncommon when farmers and buyers know each
other personally.attribute levels differ as much as possible. Table A1 in the appendix
shows the six choice sets and how often a respective alternative
was chosen by farmers.
A choice experiment needs to be carefully planned and imple-
mented as there are several factors that might lead to biased re-
sults, in particular to an overestimation of willingness to pay (for
details see Carson and Hanemann, 2005). While some problems
are more relevant when dealing with public goods, others also
need to be considered in a private good situation like ours. The
most important issue was to avoid receiving dishonest or unreli-
able answers either through the fatigue of respondents or through
an inappropriate order of choice sets. To avoid fatigue, only four of
the six choice sets were shown to each farmer. Regarding the order,
choice sets were arranged in different sequences, and question-
naires were randomly assigned to farmers. This led to the following
sample distribution of the choice sets: choice sets 1 and 2 were as-
sessed by 163 farmers, choice sets 3 and 6 by 161 farmers, and
choice sets 4 and 5 by 160 farmers, respectively.
Model speciﬁcation
The choice data thus obtained were analyzed using a random
parameters logit (RPL) model, also known as mixed logit (Hole,
2007). There are several advantages over standard logit models.
RPL models assume preference heterogeneity among respondents,
implying that they not only estimate the mean of a coefﬁcient, but
also the standard deviation of the coefﬁcient’s distribution around
the mean. When this standard deviation is signiﬁcant, preference
heterogeneity for the respective variable exists. Moreover, unre-
stricted substitution patterns are allowed in RPL models, and cor-
relation in unobserved factors is possible, which relaxes the
assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (Campbell
et al., 2006).5 In our model, we ﬁx the price coefﬁcient across the
population, because we assume that all farmers have the same pref-
erence for higher prices. The other three attributes are random
parameters, for which we assume a normal distribution in the sam-
ple (Layton and Brown, 2000).
We employ an alternative speciﬁc constant (ASC) for the third
alternative, which is the non-contract village trader marketing
channel. Thus, the estimated ASC coefﬁcient reﬂects the general
attitude of farmers towards marketing channels that do not involve
contractual arrangements. A positive ASC coefﬁcient would imply a
general preference for non-contract alternatives.nested logit models is that the respondent takes decisions stepwise (Hensher et al.
2005), meaning in our context that in a ﬁrst step the farmer decides between contrac
and non-contract marketing channels and in a second step for a certain alternative o
these categories. Our data does not support such a general ﬁrst-step decision for or
against contracts. Each farmer was shown four choice sets, and almost half of al
respondents (47%) chose both contract and non-contract alternatives in differen
choice sets. We therefore prefer the RPL model, which does not build on this
assumption. The estimation results also indicate preference heterogeneity, which is
another argument for the RPL model, because the nested logit does not account fo
preference heterogeneity.,
t
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Table 12
Random parameter logit models for farmers’ market channel choice.
Attributes Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Mean parameter
Price 0.06*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01)
ASC a 1.38*** (0.45) 2.72*** (0.65) 2.04*** (0.62)
Input provision b 1.04*** (0.27) 1.03*** (0.27) 0.99*** (0.26)
Input and credit provision b 1.30*** (0.40) 1.38*** (0.40) 1.31*** (0.39)
Payment in advance 0.19 (0.24) 0.18 (0.24) 0.08 (0.24)
Buyer known through others c 2.34*** (0.41) 2.72*** (0.44) 2.62*** (0.50)
Buyer not known c 3.31*** (0.40) 3.43*** (0.41) 3.68*** (0.54)
ASC  contract in 2007 2.45*** (0.69)
ASC  previous contract 0.43 (0.80)
ASC  land owned in rai 0.11*** (0.04)
ASC  area cultivated with sweet pepper 0.50** (0.25)
ASC  off-farm occupation 1.20** (0.54)
ASC medium road conditions d 0.80 (0.82)
ASC  bad road conditions d 4.00*** (1.03)
Standard deviation parameter
ASC 3.93*** (0.45) 3.90*** (0.48) 3.51*** (0.45)
Input provision 0.63* (0.34) 0.47 (0.33) 0.17 (0.49)
Input and credit provision 1.27** (0.59) 1.00** (0.51) 0.84 (0.65)
Payment in advance 0.18 (0.38) 0.31 (0.44) 0.30 (0.31)
Buyer known through others 0.97* (0.58) 1.40*** (0.45) 1.28** (0.54)
Buyer not known 2.04*** (0.43) 2.03*** (0.42) 2.41*** (0.51)
Log likelihood 653.76 633.44 628.04
Chi-squared 309.91*** 287.95*** 258.92***
Notes: The number of observations is n = 3  4  242 = 2904. Coefﬁcient estimates from the RPL models are shown with standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
a ASC stands for alternative speciﬁc constant. As explained in the text, this refers to the non-contract trade relation alternative in our speciﬁcation.
b Reference category is no input provision.
c Reference category is buyer is known personally.
d Reference category is good road conditions.
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ence (or aversion) is uncorrelated with other farm and farmer char-
acteristics. In simpliﬁed terms, this can be expressed as:
Yijk ¼ b0 þ b1ASC þ b2Pijk þ b3Iijk þ b4Mijk þ b5Rijk þ eijk ð1Þ
where Y is a binary variable, which takes a value of one if farmer i
chooses a contract in alternative j and choice set k; P, I, M, and R
are the contract attributes price, input provision, payment mode,
and relation to the buyer, respectively, and e is a random error term.
However, as contract preference may be correlated with socio-
economic characteristics, we specify additional models with inter-
action terms between ASC and other variables of interest. In model
(2), we explore the inﬂuence of farmers’ actual previous experience
with different marketing channels as follows:
Yijk ¼ b0 þ b1ASC þ b2Pijk þ b3Iijk þ b4Mijk þ b5Rijk þ c1ðASC
 C07iÞ þ c2ðASC CiÞ þ eijk ð2Þ
where C07 is a dummy that takes a value of one if farmer iwas actu-
ally producing under contract at the time of the interviews in 2007,
and C is a dummy that takes a value of one if the farmer produced
under contract previously but had stopped to do so at some point.
Thus, these interaction terms help to identify whether actual con-
tract experience inﬂuences general contract preferences.
In a third model, we test the inﬂuence of other socioeconomic
variables by including interactions with the ASC as follows:
Yijk ¼ b0 þ b1ASCþ b2Pijk þ b3Iijk þ b4Mijk þ b5Rijk þ d0ðASC
 FiÞ þ eijk ð3Þ
where F is a vector of farm and farmer characteristics. Initially, we
included all farm and farmer characteristics displayed in Table 1,
but then excluded those interaction terms that proved to be indi-
vidually and jointly insigniﬁcant.Estimation results
The estimation results of the three RPL models are reported in
Table 12. Coefﬁcient means as well as standard deviations for the
random parameters are shown. At ﬁrst, we concentrate on model
(1). With the exception of payment mode, all coefﬁcient means
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Results for the standard
deviations in the lower part of Table 12 show that preference het-
erogeneity exists for all attributes, except for payment mode.
This conﬁrms the structural advantage of employing the RPL
speciﬁcation.
According to expectations, the coefﬁcient of price is positive,
indicating that contracts with higher prices increase farmers’ util-
ity and the probability of choosing a contract marketing channel.
Likewise, input provision, especially when combined with addi-
tional credit provision, is an incentive for farmers to engage in con-
tracts, conﬁrming some of our earlier ﬁndings. Personally knowing
the buyer also seems to be an important aspect for farmers, as indi-
cated by the negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of the ‘‘buyer
known through others’’ and ‘‘buyer not known’’ variables. In other
words, the less a farmer knows the contract agent, the less likely
he/she is to choose a contract channel.
The positive coefﬁcient for the ASC shows that farmers gener-
ally prefer a marketing channel that does not involve a contract.
Yet, preference heterogeneity exists for this variable, so that not
all farmers necessarily share the same negative attitude towards
contractual arrangements. Table 12 also shows the results of our
second model, which includes the two ASC-contract experience
interaction terms as described above. The ASC coefﬁcient itself is
larger than in the ﬁrst model, indicating that those without own
contract experience have even more negative attitudes towards
contracts in general. The coefﬁcient of the ﬁrst interaction term
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reduced among those that actually produced under contract in
2007. Given that farmers choose their marketing channel them-
selves, this is plausible. The coefﬁcient of the second interaction
term is not signiﬁcant, implying that the hypothesis of equal gen-
eral attitudes between those who stopped producing under con-
tract and those who never had a contract cannot be rejected.
Model (3) in Table 12 shows that other socioeconomic vari-
ables also inﬂuence the general attitude towards contracts. Several
of the interaction terms between the ASC and farm and farmer
characteristics turned out to be signiﬁcant. Interesting to observe
is that the interaction with land owned has a negative coefﬁcient,
while the interaction with area under sweet pepper has a positive
coefﬁcient. Obviously, larger farmers are less averse to contracts,
unless they specialize on sweet pepper. This makes sense, because
not selling through a contract involves higher search costs to iden-
tify the appropriate marketing channel for sweet pepper. Larger
farmers who primarily focus on other enterprises may have a
higher opportunity cost of time, so that they are somewhat more
willing to opt for the time-saving contract alternative. However,
the magnitude of the coefﬁcient is relatively small (0.11), so that
a general contract aversion remains, even among the larger farm-
ers.6 For more specialized sweet pepper producers, this contract
aversion is bigger than that of the average producer. They are will-
ing and able to spend more time on sweet pepper marketing. In
addition, when sweet pepper is their main farming activity, their
perceived loss of ﬂexibility and autonomy may be bigger when
entering into a contract.
The estimation results further show that farmers with an off-
farm occupation are less contract-averse than full-time farmers,
which is probably also related to their higher opportunity cost of
time. Finally, the interaction term between the ASC and bad road
conditions is negative, which seems reasonable. Farmers in villages
with bad road conditions face higher transport costs and generally
have fewer marketing alternatives, so that they are much more
willing to enter into a contract, when the opportunity arises. The
negative coefﬁcient estimate of this interaction term is bigger in
absolute terms than the ASC coefﬁcient itself, indicating that farm-
ers in villages with bad road conditions even have a clear prefer-
ence for selling under contract.
In summary, with few exceptions, Thai sweet pepper farmers
prefer a non-contract marketing channel. In terms of contract de-
sign, they favor arrangements involving higher speciﬁed prices
and provision of inputs and credit. Moreover, they prefer contracts
with traders or agents that they know personally. Our ﬁndings
point in the same direction as those by Blandon et al. (2009),
who analyzed marketing preferences of fruit and vegetable pro-
ducers in Honduras, yet without explicitly looking at issues of con-
tract design. Overall, these results conﬁrm that – in addition to the
usual constraints that smallholders face – their marketing prefer-
ences matter for the question whether or not they participate in
modern supply chains.Willingness to accept analysis
The estimated parameters from the RPL model can also be used
to calculate the willingness to pay (WTP) for each single attribute,
which further helps to understand respondents’ incentive struc-
tures and quantify their preference levels. In consumer choice
studies, WTP is used, as these studies usually explore how much
a consumer is willing to pay for a certain attribute level that is in-
cluded in a good they are asked to buy. In our case, however, farm-6 As was shown in Table 1, the average farm size in the sample is about 4 rai.ers sell a good, so that the original question changes to what price a
farmer is willing to accept (WTA), when a certain attribute level of
a contract changes. WTA measures can be derived for each attri-
bute level by dividing the coefﬁcient of the attribute by the price
coefﬁcient and multiplying by 1 (Colombo et al., 2005).
We use the results from model (1) for these calculations, as we
are interested in the mean values. The highest WTA can be ob-
served for the attribute levels referring to the relationship with
the buyer. A farmer would require a sweet pepper price that is
55.20 Baht/kg higher to enter a contract with a buyer whom he/
she does not know personally or through others. This is an increase
of 127% compared to the average price for red sweet pepper paid
by a village trader to non-contract farmers. The marginal WTA
for entering a contract with a buyer that is not known personally
but through others is 39.00 Baht/kg, still implying an increase of
90%. The WTA for the other signiﬁcant variables is negative. When
chemicals and seeds are provided as part of the contract, farmers
would accept a price that is 17.33 Baht/kg (40%) lower than if no
inputs are provided (this is net of the actual input cost). When in-
puts and additional credit are provided, the marginal WTA is
22.60 Baht/kg, implying a price decrease of 52%. Considering
the ASC coefﬁcient, we also ﬁnd a negative WTA. A farmer would
accept a price that is 23.00 Baht/kg (53%) lower when a marketing
channel does not imply a contract of any form.
The exact WTA values should be interpreted with some caution,
and their magnitude might have to be discounted somewhat, given
the well-known hypothetical bias that stated preferences data of-
ten suffer from. However, there is no reason to believe that the
hypothetical bias is stronger for some attributes than for others,
so that a relative ranking can still be made. In this respect, it is par-
ticularly interesting to observe that for farmers the positive utility
associated with knowing the buyer seems to outweigh the negative
utility associated with entering a contract in general. This suggests
that missing personal links between companies and farmers are
more important than the fact that there are contracts as such for
explaining farmers’ withdrawal from the company marketing
channel. This is probably related to issues of trust and is an impor-
tant result for improving contractual relationships in high-value
markets.Conclusions
We have analyzed the marketing behavior of sweet pepper
farmers in Thailand in the light of ongoing market differentiation.
In particular, we examined the role and details of contractual
arrangements to better understand farmers’ market channel
choices. Sweet pepper was introduced in Thailand some 10 years
ago, mainly meant for exports and upscale domestic supermarkets.
Initially, specialized companies were the only available marketing
channel, purchasing sweet pepper from farmers via contractual
arrangements. More recently, the Royal Project, which also caters
for modern retail outlets, and traditional village traders entered
the market. Whereas the Royal Project also mostly works with con-
tracts, many village traders purchase sweet pepper from farmers
without a contractual arrangement. Over time, village traders be-
came the most important marketing channel for sweet pepper;
many farmers who had previously sold to companies switched to
supplying village traders.
Our descriptive comparison of marketing channels and contract
features conﬁrms that signiﬁcant differences exist, which inﬂuence
farmers’ choices. While output prices matter, farmers also value
other aspects such as access to inputs, credit, and information, as
well as independence and ﬂexibility. Contract marketing channels
are associated with higher net incomes. Strikingly, however, gross
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suppliers are relatively small and not statistically signiﬁcant.
A choice experiment was used to analyze farmers’ attitudes
towards contracts and related details more directly. The results
reveal that farmers generally prefer non-contract marketing op-
tions. Yet there are certain factors that inﬂuence this general
attitude. In terms of farm and farmer characteristics, higher
opportunity costs of time and fewer marketing alternatives as
a result of bad infrastructure conditions increase the attractive-
ness of entering into a contractual arrangement. In terms of
contract design, contracts that also involve the provision of in-
puts and credit are clearly preferred. Remarkably, the most
important factor is the relationship between farmers and buyers.
The positive utility associated with knowing the buyer person-
ally seems to outweigh the negative utility associated with
entering into a contract in general, which is probably related
to issues of trust.
In many developing countries, the role of modern supply chains
involving contractual agreements between farmers and agribusi-
ness ﬁrms or their agents is growing. Hence, the question of how
smallholder farmers can be linked successfully to these emerging
markets is of high policy relevance. Much recent work has ana-
lyzed factors that might potentially hinder smallholder participa-
tion, mostly focusing on transaction costs and ﬁnancial and
technical constraints. Our results suggest that concentrating on
such constraints alone may result in an incomplete picture, be-
cause farmers’ marketing preferences also matter. This should be
considered more explicitly in future research.
For sweet pepper in Thailand, companies have started to estab-
lish own integrated production plants in peri-urban areas, partly
because they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to source sufﬁcient produce from
smallholder farmers. Similar trends can also be observed for other
high-value products and in other countries. Sometimes, integrated
production by agribusiness companies can generate new employ-
ment opportunities for rural households, as was found by Maertens
and Swinnen (2009) in Senegal. But this cannot always be ex-
pected; in Thailand, for instance, integrated sweet pepper produc-
tion is very technology-intensive, with little use of unskilled
manual labor. Hence, not integrating small farms into modern sup-
ply chains more successfully can be associated with lost opportu-
nities for rural development.
Beyond addressing widespread market imperfections, which is
certainly important, our results suggest that improving the rela-
tionship between farmers and buyers could also contribute to
more widespread smallholder participation in contractual arrange-
ments. Against this background, the fact that company representa-
tives and intermediaries are often non-locals is not conducive. One
approach could be to more explicitly involve local traders, who
have established long-term relationships with farmers. Where this
is not possible logistically, companies and intermediaries could try
to improve ties with farmers through other trust-building mecha-
nisms, such as more frequent personal interactions and more
transparent pricing and grading procedures.Acknowledgment
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